Sri Lanka’s 2017 Interim Report in Light of the Experiences of Switzerland, India, Kosovo, and South Africa
Comparative
international experience demonstrates a crucial lesson: Switzerland, India,
Kosovo, and South Africa adopted different constitutional models, yet none
relied on fear-driven politics. Instead, they chose negotiated
settlements and gradual institutional integration.
“Unitary”
vs. “Federal”: The Politics of Terminology
In Sri
Lanka, the words “Unitary” and “Federal” carry more emotional weight than
structural meaning. At the time of establishing the Constitutional Assembly, it
was acknowledged that people in the South feared the term “Federal,” while
people in the North feared the term “Unitary.”
A
constitution should not be a document that people fear; it should be a
framework that generates trust.
Moreover,
the meaning of “Unitary State” has evolved globally. In the United Kingdom,
Scotland and Northern Ireland can politically debate secession. This
demonstrates that constitutional terminology does not remain frozen in its
original definition.
In Sri
Lanka, “aekiya rajyaya” (often translated as “unitary state”) is commonly
understood in Sinhala as an “indivisible state.” The Tamil equivalent,
“orumiththa nadu,” implies a “united country.” However, the central issue is
not terminology but institutional substance.
Tamil
political parties must clarify publicly: Are they advocating a federation with
a right to secession, or an indivisible federal structure? Without such
clarity, debates over language become political theatre, while meaningful
institutional reform is sidelined.
Switzerland:
Federalism Built on Trust
Cantons
retain residual powers. They possess genuine fiscal autonomy, as do
municipalities (Gemeinden). Constitutional amendments require a double
majority—both of the people and the cantons. This means regional concerns are
not left to the goodwill of the central government; they are constitutionally
secured.
The
Moutier–Jura case further illustrates this principle. A long-standing
territorial identity dispute was resolved not through violence, but through
multiple referendums, judicial review, and renewed voting when irregularities
were alleged. The lesson is clear: territorial questions need not threaten
national unity if institutional trust exists.
For Sri
Lanka, the takeaway is straightforward: institutions matter more than labels.
India:
Centralized Resilience
The Supreme
Court’s Basic Structure Doctrine prevents parliamentary majorities from
altering the foundational principles of the Constitution. This demonstrates
that even within a centralized system, compromise and judicial oversight can
maintain unity.
Kosovo:
Veto-Based Minority Protection
Such
mechanisms embed protection directly into institutional structures. However,
they serve as safeguards while trust develops; they do not replace the
long-term need for political reconciliation.
South
Africa: Judicial Transformation
Without
strong judicial safeguards, constitutional reform remains fragile.
Sri
Lanka’s Interim Report in Comparative Perspective
The 2017
Interim Report sought to introduce several important reforms, including a
reconsideration of the rigid “Unitary” concept, the proposal of maximum
devolution of powers, the establishment of a second chamber, and the creation
of a Constitutional Court. These proposals reflected an attempt to move beyond
entrenched positions and to institutionalize a more balanced framework of
governance.
At the same
time, the report contained significant weaknesses. Fiscal autonomy remained
limited, residual powers were still largely retained by the central government,
and no strong veto mechanisms were introduced to provide structural safeguards
for minority communities. These shortcomings were real and substantial.
However,
rejecting the entire reform process solely because of these deficiencies risks
producing political paralysis. And political paralysis does not create
stability; it deepens fear. Fear, in turn, strengthens extremist narratives and
narrows the space for constructive compromise.
Two
Nationalisms, One Outcome
A striking
paradox in Sri Lanka is that both Sinhala hardline nationalism and Tamil
hardline nationalism reject compromise proposals. Their shared rejection
narrows the space for moderate negotiation.
This raises
a difficult but necessary question: Does absolute rejection serve genuine
self-governance, or does it perpetuate endless conflict politics?
Constitutional
reform is not for Tamils alone; it concerns all citizens of Sri Lanka. A
two-thirds parliamentary majority may be legally sufficient for certain
amendments, and referendums may be required for others. But constitutional
durability depends on broad societal consent, not mere arithmetic.
The
Responsibility of Tamil Politics and the Diaspora
Another
crucial dimension is the need to move beyond emotional politics. The question
“What did so many sacrifices achieve?” is painful and legitimate. Yet if
emotional memory becomes the basis for rejecting incremental reforms—fiscal
decentralization, judicial safeguards, gradual power-sharing—the result is
political stagnation.
If, after
decades of conflict, an independent state has not materialized, then strategic
reassessment is not disrespect; it is political maturity.
Similarly,
claims of exclusive representation are dangerous. Political monopolization
suppresses internal pluralism and weakens negotiation capacity. Tamil politics
must remain pluralistic rather than centralized in a single voice.
The Path
Forward
Comparative
experience offers clear lessons. Switzerland illustrates how federalism can
function on the basis of mutual trust and shared sovereignty. India
demonstrates how a politically centralized system can maintain resilience when
supported by strong judicial protection. Kosovo shows how veto-based
institutional safeguards can protect minority communities in deeply divided
societies. South Africa reveals how judicial transformation can turn a
constitution into a vehicle for societal change.
For Sri
Lanka, these lessons point toward a focus on institutional design rather than
divisive terminology. The emphasis must be on strengthening judicial
safeguards, implementing meaningful fiscal decentralization, and pursuing
phased, incremental reforms that gradually build confidence among communities.
Equally important is the construction of cross-community political alliances
that frame constitutional reform not as a sectional demand, but as a shared
national project.
Extremism—regardless
of its origin—obstructs progress by amplifying fear and narrowing the space for
compromise. A constitution should not be a document of anxiety; it must be a
contract grounded in trust. Until such trust is firmly established, gradual reform,
credible institutional guarantees, and broad-based political consensus remain
the only realistic path toward a sustainable resolution of Sri Lanka’s national
question.
